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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the executive departments providing for judicial determination of the
applicability of evidentiary privileges.
INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE:
COURTS v. COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is vested with the responsi-
bility of interpreting and enforcing tax laws,1 and is normally bound to
follow his own interpretation. However, the federal courts also are in-
terpreters of the tax laws. Thus the Commissioner is in a quandary
when faced with a court of appeals decision which conflicts with his own
interpretation or application of the tax code.2 The path of direct appeal
from the initial adverse decision is practically blocked by the Supreme
Court's policy of limited certiorari. Normally the Supreme Court will
review a tax case only when it is in conflict with a case previously de-
cided in another circuit.' Therefore the Commissioner has a Hobson's
choice between accepting the interpretation of the court of appeals, which,
in view of the improbability of a contrary decision then arising in an-
other circuit, has the effect of abandoning all hope of a Supreme Court
decision, and continuing to apply his own interpretation in the face of a
contrary judicial holding.' If the Commissioner can, through the latter
course, acquire a conflicting decision in another circuit he may be able
to receive Supreme Court review of the question, but in the meantime
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7802.
2. See, e.g., Pollak v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1954) ; Mutch v. Com-
missioner, 209 F.2d 390 (3rd Cir. 1954) ; Abernethy v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 651 (D.C.
Cir. 1954); Kavanagh v. Hershman, 210 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1954); United States v.
Bennett, 186 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1951); Fox v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 101 (2nd Cir.
1951) ; Commissioner v. Switlik, 184 F.2d 299 (3rd Cir. 1950) ; Albright v. United States,
173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949); Schall v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949);
McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
3. See Rule 19 of RULES OF THE SuP. CT., as revised in 1954, 74 Sup. Ct. 945 (1954).
4. There are several reasons why acquiescing in certain court of appeals decisions
may be contrary to the public's interest:
(1) Decisions may unconsciously favor one group of taxpayers. Since taxation
must produce a total amount of revenue for government requirements, other taxpayers
must bear the increased burden.
(2) The Commissioner may be better able to evaluate the effect of a certain
decision on other taxpayers and the country as a whole than can a single court of appeals.
See notes 6-10 infra and accompanying text.
(3) A taxpayer is not estopped by res judicata or other legal doctrines from
litigating a point which he feels has been determined erroneously, merely because an-
other taxpayer litigated the identical point and lost. Nor would it be in the public interest
to estop the Commissioner from subsequently re-litigating a point, since the Commissioner
is in a better position to evaluate a decision than a single taxpayer.
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taxpayers must remain highly uncertain as to the state of disputed sec-
tions of the tax laws.
Consideration must be given to the position of the Internal Revenue
Service and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is the Internal
Revenue Service's task to oversee the collection of revenue.5 This re-
quires the enforcement of the tax law as it has been legislated. The In-
ternal Revenue Service must determine if the opinion handed down by
th court of appeals is one that can be applied on a nation-wide basis and
one that will not lead to confusion and unfairness in future cases. A case
illustrating the situation where a tax interpretation appears presently to
be advantageous to the taxpayer, but which is adverse in the long run is
Commissioner v. Eccles,6 which held that a couple were not legally sepa-
rated under an interlocutory decree of divorce. This holding was ad-
vantageous to the particular taxpayers before the court, since they wished
to file a joint return. However, it would be a distinct disadvantage to
those separated couples who did not want to file jointly. The effect of
this decision would be to deny persons filing separately a deduction for
alimony payments,' expenses for the care of certain dependents,8 and
would prevent the opportunity to qualify as the head of the household.9
In a case such as this the Commissioner must look beyond the immediate
result of the decision, if he is to maintain the goodwill of the public
which is vital to a system of self-assessed taxation."0 Many cases simi-
larly have vast administrative and revenue implications1 which effect
5. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, the Internal Revenue Service collected
more than sixty-five billion dollars, received ninety million tax returns, handled over two
hundred million other related information documents and audited and investigated more
than four million returns. ANN. REP. OF COMAE'R OF INT. REv. 83 (1952).
6. 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953).
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(u), added by 56 STAT. 817 (1942) (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 215).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 214.
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 12(c) (3), added by 65 STAT. 480 (1942) (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § I(b)).
10. The Commissioner maintains that he cannot follow all of the courts of appeals'
decisions, for some cannot be applied on a nation-wide basis without confusion and un-
fairness. Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Appropriation, 84th Cong., 2nd
Sess., Jan. 26 (1956) 5 CCH 1956 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 11978. An analysis of the
cases which the Commissioner has refused to follow, fails to disclose any pattern of
consistency or any criteria which the Commissioner uses in determinating those cases
which cannot be applied fairly on a nation-wide basis.
11. See United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 134 Ct. Cl. 800, - F. Supp.-
(1956), Rev'd, 352 U.S. 306 (1957) ; United States v. Ohio Power Co., 131 Ct. Cl. 95, 129
F. Supp. 215 (1955), petition for rehearing continued 351 U.S. 980 (1956); Wickes
Corp. v. United States, 123 Ct. Cf. 741, 108 F. Supp. 616 (1952) ; these cases held that
accelerated amortization under § 124 of the 1939 Code was not necessarily limited to the
amount certified as necessary to the national defense. A conflict was created by
National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 161 (2nd Cir. 1956), Aff'd 352 U.S. 313
(1957). See, e.g., Carpenter v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1955), which dealt
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federal tax policy. It is desirable that issues such as those involved in
tax which have a widespread impact on the public interest be finally
settled at an early date; however, the creation of a conflict among the
circuits is usually a time consuming process.'2 One questions the merit
of delay and conflict in regard to tax law, which has extremely broad'
application and which is constantly being amended."
A review of a few cases demonstrates the effects of the Commis-
sioner's policy, of not following court of appeals decisions, on various
groups of taxpayers. For example, it was held in the case of Shall v.
Commissioner,4 that retirement grants to ministers were not includable
in gross income. The Commissioner refused to accept this proposition
until it had been substantiated in three other circuits. 5 In another situa-
tion adverse rulings in four circuits were required in cases involving
surety collections before the Commissioner saw fit to change his posi-
with the taxability of patronage dividends and was decided adversely to the Commis-
sioner; United States v. Cherokee Brick & Tile Co., 218 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1953), raised
the question of percentage depletion on finished brick and tile and was decided in favor
of the taxpayer. See also Gallo Winery v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1955)
which is in conflict with Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 229 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1955),
cert. granted, 351 U.S. 961 (1956) ; these cases involve the carryover and carryback of net
operating losses and excess-profits credits following statutory mergers. See Traynor,
Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax-A
Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COL. L. REv. 1393, 1409 n. 35 (1938).
12. "Often a decade may pass before uniformity is restored through a decision
of the Supreme Court. For example, in 1930 the Board of Tax Appeals decided that a
loss realized by a taxpayer on a sale of property to a corporation wholly owned by him
was not a deductable loss. In 1934 this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Thereafter the ninth,
eighth and second circuit courts of appeals rendered similar decisions. The Board
bowed before these authorities and likewise allowed such losses. But the Commissioner
persisted in his view that the losses were not deductible. In 1939 his persistence bore
fruit when the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit decided a case on a theory
contrary to the other decisions. The Supreme Court consequently granted certiorari to
review the question, and in 1940 rewarded the Commissioner's tenacity with a decision
denying the deductibility of such losses. But between the consideration of the issue
by the Board and its final determination by the Supreme Court was a decade of uncer-
tainty and litigation." Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administra-
tion, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 399, 416, 417 (1940).
13. Professor Surrey's words of some sixteen years ago are still very true:
"Many a tax question is no nearer a 'right' decision after four or five circuit
courts of appeals have battled over it than when the first court pronounced its
judgment. All that has happened is that each of the several reasonable but con-
tradictory positions has been given a stamp of judicial approval. Meanwhile a
confused Bureau and a bewildered taxpayer, who would be quite content to
adjust themselves to the first decision if it were left unchallenged, are forced
to struggle along as best they can until the Supreme Court selects one of the
available alternatives and it becomes the 'right' answer, at least until Congress
acts. . . ." Id. at 419. Also see note 61 infra.
14. 174 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949).
15. Abernethy v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Mutch v. Commis-
sioner, 209 F.2d 390 (3rd Cir. 1954) ; Kavanagh v. Hershman, 210 F.2d 654 (6th Cir.
1954).
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tion.Y Farmers were subjected to the adverse effects of the policy when
the Commissioner was slow in accepting the proposition, as determined
in two circuits, that proceeds from the sales of certain livestock were to
be given capital gains treatment." In another instance, the Commis-
sioner took the position that loss as a guarantor was a non-business bad
debt rather than an ordinary loss. In cases involving this issue four
court of appeals ruled adversely to this position. 8 The first of these
cases was decided in 1951 and the last in 1955; thus for four years the
law remained unsettled. In each of the above cases a taxpayer was un-
able to rely on reported cases in making business decisions and eventually
was forced to litigate to avoid payment of additional taxes."
A taxpayer may be placed in a better bargaining position once a
court of appeals has held on an issue, since he can threaten to appeal the
Commissioner's interpretation if it is contrary to the court's interpreta-
tion."o  However, in order to attain this superior bargaining position,
the taxpayer or his counsel must first be aware of those court of appeals'
decisions which are contrary to the Commissioner's interpretation. The
deficiency notice sent by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the
taxpayer does not inform him of an interpretation of a court of appeals
that is contrary to the interpretation of the Commissioner, which has
given rise to the asserted deficiency.2 It seems improper that a taxpayer
cannot rely that a deficiency asserted by the Internal Revenue Service
16. United States v. Zschach Construction, 209 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Firemen's
Fund Indemnity Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Westover v. Simpson
Construction Co., 209 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Crosland Construction
Co., 217 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1954) ; General Casualty Co. of America v. United States,
205 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1953); United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. United
States, 201 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1952).
17. United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Albright v. United
States, 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949). Favorable treatment was subsequently provided
by Congress. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(j) (1), as amended, 65 STAT. 501 (1951)
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1231 (b) (3)).
18. Cudlip v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Pollak v. Commissioner,
209 F.2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1954) ; Edwards v. Allen, 216 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Fox v.
Commissioner, 190 F.2d 101 (2nd Cir. 1951). A conflict was created by Putnam v. Com-
missioner, 224 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
19. See note 12 supra.
20. The majority of deficiency cases are settled before litigation by revenue agents
in the field or by stipulation. Of some 72,000 cases docketed in the fiscal years 1940
through 1955, approximately 48,000 were disposed of by stipulation. ANN. REP. OF
COmm'R OF INT. Rav. 111 (1955). District directors now process a large majority of
tax and penalty offers in compromise before they are docketed. Offers accepted for
fiscal year 1954 and 1955 totaled 47,313 and those rejected totaled 13,593. Id. at 38.
21. In some instances the Commissioner issues an announcement that he will not
follow a court of appeals decision. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 13121, 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 13;
this stated the Commissioner would not follow McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d
585 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Rev. Rul. 13366, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 33; this was an announce-
ment by the Commissioner not to follow Motch v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 859 (6th Cir.
1950).
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represents settled law rather than law which is decidedly questionable
owing to a contrary court interpretation. Rather a taxpayer in certain
instances has the burden of discovering contrary cases and must threaten
litigation to avail himself of the courts' rulings.
The effect of the Commissioner's refusal to follow certain court of
appeals' decisions is to deny some taxpayers uniform treatment. In-
itially, all taxpayers are treated alike; however, if a taxpayer litigates an
issue and wins, the Commissioner will generally not appeal if the tax-
payer's court of appeals has previously ruled adversely to the Commis-
sioner's position on the same point.2" For instance, the Eighth Circuit
in Albright v. United States23 determined that sales of certain livestock
were to be allowed capital gains treatment. A revenue bulletin indicated
that certiorari would not be sought in the Albright case, "but petitions
for review of Tax Court cases will be filed outside the Eighth Circuit."2
Thus in those circuits where the court of appeals has rendered a decision
favorable to the interpretation of the taxpayer, the taxpayer is spared the
expense of defending his interpretation in the court of appeals. On the
other hand, a taxpayer of a circuit where no court of appeals decision has
been rendered favorable to his position may be forced to defend his in-
terpretation in the appellate court as well as the lower court.
Furthermore, there will not be a uniform treatment of taxpayers in
the Tax Court, if the holding of the Sixth Circuit in Stacey Manufac-
turing Company v. Commissioner5 is accepted. The court of appeals
held that the Tax Court has no authority to decline to follow a court of
appeals decision on a question of law in passing on the tax liability of a
resident of the court's circuit. Under this rule, the Tax Court is required
to apply different rules to taxpayers living in the several circuits when
there is a conflict in the decisions of the various circuits. The Court of
Appeals stated that the desire of the Tax Court to establish a uniform
rule does not empower it to disregard the various decisions of the courts
of appeals. Finally the court said "until the Supreme Court reverses a
rule by the court of appeals for its circuit that rule must be followed."26
If carried a step further this reasoning might force the Commissioner to
follow the interpretations of the court of appeals in determining whether
22. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 948 (D.C. Neb. 1951), which
followed and was in the same circuit as Albright v. United States, 173 F.2d 339 (8th
Cir. 1949). The government lost in the Miller case; however no appeal was made for the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously decided the issue adversely to the
government's position in the Albright case.
23. 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949).
24. 4 P-H 1949 FED. TAX SERV. 91 70,480, Sept. 15, 1949.
25. 237 F.2d 605 (1956). There will be no petition for certiorari filed. 4 P-H 1957
FED. TAX SERV. 1 71,035.
26. Stacey Manufacturing Company v. Commissioner 237 F.2d 605, 606 (1956).
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to assert a deficiency within that circuit. Such a policy would have to be
initiated to prevent the inevitable reversal in the Tax Court of an inter-
pretation by the Commissioner that is contrary to that of the taxpayer's
circuit, for the Tax Court is compelled to follow the interpretation of
the taxpayer's court of appeals.2 7  Thus under a single national tax code
taxpayers would not receive uniform treatment even in the initial appli-
cation of the code.
It would seem logical to assume that when a court of appeals inter-
pretates the tax code, the law should move forward. If the system of
common law jurisprudence is to be effective, then decided cases on a
given point should have the tendency to settle the point and forestall and
prevent the need to further litigate the same point. However, in a num-
ber of instances, decided cases are neither furthering the law nor settling
a point.28  Rather it seems the taxpayer breeds litigation by following
the decision, since the Commissioner appears to be looking for an op-
portunity to relitigate the point in an attempt to create a conflict and
thus obtain Supreme Court review. This is not to say that any single
taxpayer receives unique injury. Rather, the entire taxpaying commu-
nity is hurt by the fact that the law is neither being moved forward nor
being clarified by judicial decision. A single tax code applies to all the
people, yet the courts of appeals are not able to settle the law and give a
single answer which will insure uniform treatment of taxpayers. Even
though several courts of appeals have rendered similar decisions on an
issue, the law remains clouded if the Commissioner refuses to accept the
courts' interpretation. Under the present system the Commissioner is
free to disregard courts of appeals' decisions; this is a detriment to all
taxpayers who must base their decisions as to tax consequences on re-
ported holdings of the courts of appeals. For example, before the recent
case of Putnam v. Commissioner," four courts of appeals" had held a
loss sustained as a guarantor of a corporate note was deductible by the
guarantor as a business loss.2 However, the Commissioner refused to
accept this position and continued to interpret such a loss as a non-
27. Ibid.
28. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
29. 224 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
30. Cudlip v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Edwards v. Allen, 216
F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Pollak v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1954) ; Fox v.
Commissioner, 190 F.2d 101 (2nd Cir. 1951).
31. Business losses are deductable as ordinary losses from gross income in the year
they are incurred, but non-business bad debts are treated as short term capital losses.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 23(e) (2), 23(k) (4), 53 STAT. 13 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 165,166).
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business bad debt.12  Thus a taxpayer who owned a large majority of the
stock of a closely owned corporation which was in need of funds was in
a quandary as to the method of obtaining the loan. Once he decided to
aid the corporation personally, there were two alternatives. He might
make a personal loan directly to the corporation, thus saving the addi-
tional expense of interest, but at the same time denying himself the ad-
vantage of treating a potential loss as a business loss for tax purposes.3"
Or he might be willing to forgo the interest saving, and personally guar-
antee a loan from a third party to the corporation, if he were certain that
a loss as surety would be treated as a business loss. Even after four
courts of appeals had rendered like decisions on the point,34 within a cir-
cuit which had not litigated the question the potential tax treatment of
such a loss was anything but clear. And even in a circuit which had de-
cided the issue, the taxpayer could hardly rest easy in secure knowledge
that his decision was founded on legal bedrock. The Commissioner's
persistence in hewing to a contrary interpretation in other jurisdictions
was obviously designed to present eventually the issue to the Supreme
Court for review, and was likely to result in a final reversal of the
earlier court of appeals cases."
32. That the Commissioner refused to accept the business loss interpretation is
illustrated by Putnam v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 352 U.S.
82 (1956).
33. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(k), 53 STAT. 13 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 166).
34. See note 30 supra.
35. The commissioner's interpretation that such a loss was a non-business bad debt
was upheld by the Supreme Court. Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
The Commissioner's interpretation of the code is vindicated by the Supreme Court
in the majority of cases. An analysis of Supreme Court tax decisions for the past six
years shows the government's position sustained in twenty cases, while the position of the
taxpayer was accepted in sixteen cases. With a few exceptions, these cases all involved
a conflict of circuits. The government's position was accepted in the cases as follows:
Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956) ; Corn Products
Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1956) ; Millinery Center Bldg. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 350 U.S. 456 (1956) ; Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956);
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) ; General American Investors
v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955) ; United States v. Olympic Radio & Television
Inc., 349 U.S. 232 (1955) ; Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237 (1955) ; Com-
missioner v. Estate of Louis Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1955) ; United States v. Koppers
Co., 348 U.S. 254 (1955) ; Premier Oil Refining Co. of Texas v. United States, 348 U.S.
254 (1955) ; Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953) ; Commissioner v. Smith, 345
U.S. 278 (1953) ; United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953) ; Watson
v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544 (1953) ; Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952) ;
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) ; Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118
(1952) ; Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952) ; United States v. Lewis, 340
U.S. 590 (1951). The cases decided contrary to the Commissioner's position were as
follow: United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383 (1956) ; United States v. Hunt-
ington Beach Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956) ; Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. United States,
350 U.S. 488 (1956) ; Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); Marcelle v. Tupia, 348
U.S. 956 (1955) ; United States v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 350 U.S. 55 (1955);
Central Bank v. United States, 345 U.S.. 639 (1953) ; United States v. Edens & Cory,
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Certainly, it is in the public interest for the Commissioner to attempt
to obtain Supreme Court review of those judicial interpretations of the
code which he feels do not carry out congressional tax policies."6 Within
the present system the policy of the Commissioner not to acquiesce in cer-
tain decisions of the courts of appeals appears to be the only practical
method of obtaining Supreme Court review," yet this policy not only in-
evitably involves further delays in settling tax implications of transac-
tions which, insofar as they are elements in business planning, cry for
certainty; it also contributes additional uncertainty to tax planning for
business purposes.
One possible solution would be to limit the scope of judicial review
of Tax Court decisions.3" At present the lack of administrative finality
afforded Tax Court cases is causing many of them to be reversed on
appeal. During the past four years the Tax Court has been reversed in
approximately one third of the cases appealed from it. 8 This is partly
342 U.S. 912 (1952); United States v. General Engineering Mfg. Co., 342 U.S. 912
(1952); United States v. Bloom, 342 U.S. 912 (1952); Alison v. United States, 344
U.S. 167 (1952) ; United States v. Stevenson, 344 U.S. 167 (1952) ; Lilly v. Commis-
sioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952) ; Brown Shoe Company v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950) ;
Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U.S. 619 (1950); Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106
(1950).
This compilation does not include criminal cases, cases involving priority of federal
tax liens, and cases questioning the constitutionality of the various taxes. In these cases
the government's position is consistently upheld.
36. See note 4 supra.
37. See Rule 19 of RULES OF THE SuP. CT, as revised 1954, 74 Sup. Ct. 945 (1954).
The 1954 October term of the Supreme Court was typical. The government applied
for certiorari in ten cases involving federal taxation. Certiorari was granted in five,
and of these, four had clear conflicts between circuits. Squire v. Capoeman, 220 F.2d
349 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 816 (1955), aff'd, 351 U.S. 1 (1956);
United States v. Huntington Beach Co., 132 Ct. Cl. 427, 132 F. Supp. 718 (1955),
cert. granted, 350 U.S. 818 (1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 308 (1956) ; United States v. Leslie
Salt Co., 218 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. granted, 349 U.S. 951 (1955), affd, 350
U.S. 383 (1956); Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 220 F.2d 58 (9th Cir.
1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 818 (1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 308 (1956). The fifth case
involved a constitutional question of interpreting income. Commissioner v. LoBue, 223
F.2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 893 (1955), rev'd, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
In the five cases denied certiorari, there were no clear conflicts between the circuits.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 128 Ct. Cl. 465, 121 F.Supp. 932 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955) ; Commissioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875 (3rd Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954) ; Commissioner v. McCue Bros., 210 F.2d 752 (2nd Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954) ; Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Commissioner v. Swaney & Sons, Inc., 212
F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
An exception to the rule that a clear conflict must exist is where a constitutional
question is involved. See 28 U.S.C. § 1252.
38. By act of Congress this court is "an independent agency in the Executive Branch
of the Government." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7441. The present provision was derived
from Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 1100, 53 STAT. 158 (1939), which in turn was derived
from 44 STAT. 105 (1926).
39. Nevitt, Achieving Uniformity Among the ii Courts of Last Resort, 34 TAXES
311 (1956).
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attributable to the broad review granted by the courts of appeals. Con-
sequently the Tax Court and various courts of appeals often interpret the
tax code differently." If the various courts of appeals were consistent
in their application of a limited standard of judicial review, then it would
appear that the basis for the Commissioner's refusal to follow court of
appeals decisions would be largely removed. This conclusion is premised
on the assumption that the Tax Court in a subsequent case on a disputed
point would follow its former decision and that a second court of appeals
in reviewing the point and applying a uniform standard of limited review
would dispose of the case in the same manner as did a prior court of
appeals. In theory this solution would to a large extent alter the Com-
missioner's present policy of non-acquiescence in court of appeals deci-
sions and would tend to settle the law at an early date in accordance
with the views of an expert administrative tribunal-the Tax Court. An
additional means of settling the law would be a requirement that the
Commissioner follow the first court of appeals decision on a disputed
point, unless he were successful in obtaining Supreme Court review. This
requirement would take care of the rare cases where a court of appeals,
even under its limited standard of judicial review, reversed the Tax
Court. Thus even in those cases where the Tax Court was on the Com-
missioner's side of a proposition, the Commissioner would be precluded
from attempting to get a more favorable treatment before another court
of appeals in order to create a conflict and receive Supreme Court review.
The proposed solution is partially premised on the theory that the
Supreme Court would recognize that the Commissioner was, either prac-
tically or coercively, required to follow the interpretation of a court of
appeals even though that interpretation was contrary to his own, and
that therefore the Court would be more willing to examine the issues in-
volved than at present. The constant increase in the workload of the
Supreme Court makes this a questionable assumption.41
The obvious advantage of the proposed solution would be the settling
of the tax law at an early date. Two theoretical objections may be
raised: first, judicial review of Tax Court decisions would be seriously
40. For example the Tax Court rendered like decisions in two similar situations
in favor of the taxpayers. The government appealed the cases and the Second Circuit
reversed, but the Tax Court was affirmed in the Sixth Circuit. Healy v. Commissioner,
16 T.C. 200 (1951), rev'd, 194 F.2d 662 (2nd Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U.S. 278 (1953);
Commissioner v. Smith, 11 T.C. 174 (1948), aff'd, 194 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1952), revzd,
345 U.S. 278 (1953). See also McCoy v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 828 (1950), rev'd, 192
F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1951) ; Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 876 (1950), rev'd, 193
F.2d 734 (2nd Cir. 1952). See Nevitt, Achieving Uniformity Among the ii Courts of
Last Resort, 34 TAXEs 311 (1956).
41. See ANN. REP. OF THE DiR. OF THE ADmA. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. p. 149-151
(1955).
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limited-the courts of appeals being relegated almost to a rubber-stamp
role; second, that the Commissioner would be removed from his function
of interpreting the tax laws at an early stage. A practical objection to
the proposed solution may also be made, in that it is extremely difficult
to discover a workable standard for limiting the scope of judicial review
by the courts of appeals.
One method of giving more administrative finality to Tax Court
decisions would be to return to the Revenue Act of 1926 which limited
review of those decisions to "questions of law."42  However, owing to
the inherent vagueness of such a rule the courts initially gave this sec-
tion of the tax code little attention. It was not until Dobson v. Commis-
sioner"' that any real attempt was made to limit review to "clear cut mis-
takes of law."" In this case the Supreme Court attempted to establish
guiding standards which would restrict review within narrow bounds.
In general the Court held that: (1) the Tax Court's determination of
a purely factual issue is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence
and not arbitrary; (2) mixed questions of law and fact are reviewable
only if they have general application-if the question is peculiar to the
case under review, the Tax Court's decision is conclusive if reasonable
and not arbitrary; (3) the Tax Court's decision on questions of law is
reviewable, but it must stand unless clearly erroneous. This policy of
review did not result in complete uniformity because, then, as now, tax
cases could be tried in the district courts and the Court of Claims, and
review of these cases was not subject to the Dobson rule.45 The Dobson
rule met with poor reception owing to the difficulty of separating ques-
,tions of accounting, which were supposedly questions of fact and not
generally reviewable, from questions of law, which were reviewable."
Consequently, in 1948 Congress rejected the rule. Legislation was then
enacted requiring the courts of appeals to review decisions of the Tax
Court "in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of Dis-
trict Courts in civil actions without a jury."" In the 1954 Revenue Act
this was again adopted." Thus under present law a court of appeals will
42. Revenue Act of 1926, § 1103(b), 44 STAT. 846.
43. 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
44. See Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Facts,
57 HARV. L. Rav. 753 (1944).
45. The basis of the Dobson rule is that the highly specialized character of the
Tax Court entitles its decisions to a high degree of finality in the courts. This rationale
is lacking for the district courts and the Courts of Claims.
46. See Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57
HARv. L. REV. 753, 764 (1944).
47. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 1141 (a), added by 62 STAT. 991 (1948).
48. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(a).
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not set aside the Tax Court's findings of fact unless "clearly erroneous."49
However, in practice it appears that the courts of appeals have tended to
grant unusually broad review to cases appealed from the Tax Court.5"
This has led to reversals of one-third of the cases appealed from the Tax
Court by the taxpayer."
There are two principal factors which would make the granting of
more administrative finality to Tax Court decisions a sterile solution.
First, vital in arguing for this solution is the proposition that accounting
as related to tax matters is not a science with definite rules; therefore,
the Tax Court as an expert tribunal can best decide accounting problems
as questions of fact. A review of the reception given the Dobson case
shows that the courts of appeals are not ready to accept this proposition. 2
The second and more fundamental factor which makes more Tax Court
finality an unworkable solution is the fact that there will never be com-
plete uniformity among the courts of appeals. The existing system of
appellate review makes it impossible. Most of the decisions appealed are
from one court, the Tax Court,53 yet these decisions are subject to review
by eleven tribunals.54 The fact that one circuit has ruled on a question
does not prevent a taxpayer in another circuit from subsequently litigat-
ing the issue. A contrary opinion may result on the same section of the
revenue code. 5
Several authorities advocate the creation of a Tax Court of Appeals
as a practical solution to the problem.56 The increased number of con-
49. The Supreme Court has stated that a finding of fact is "clearly erroneous"
when "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
50. See Nevitt, Achieving Uniformity Among the ii Courts of Last Resort, 34
TAXES 311, 314-15, n. 18 (1956).
51. Id. at 311.
52. See 93 CONG. REC. A3279-A3281 (1947).
53. Almost eighty per cent of tax controversies that go to court are filed in the
Tax Court. During fiscal 1955, 4639 cases were docketed in the Tax Court; in the Court
of Claims and in the district courts 1017 were filed. ANN. REP. OF COIM1'R OF INT. REV.
113, 114 (1955).
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482.
55. See e.g., the cases cited in note 35 supra.
56. Griswold, The Need for a Tax Court of Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1153 (1944).
See Surry, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration, 25 WASH.
U. L. Q. 399 (1940) ; Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal In-
come, Estate, and Gift Tax-A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COL. L. REV. 1393 (1938).
This presents a solution not only to the problem created by the refusal of the
Commissioner to accept decisions of the courts of appeals in certain cases, but also to the
problem of lack of uniformity among the circuits even when the Commissioner has
accepted the decisions handed down. The latter problem arises when the reasoning of a
prior case, which was advantageous to the taxpayer, is not beneficial when applied
to another taxpayer in a different fact situation. See note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
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stitutional and administrative cases handled by the Supreme Court 7 de-
creases the available time for tax cases and emphasizes the need for a Tax
Court of Appeals. Ideally this court would have exclusive jurisdiction
to review civil, federal tax decisions of district courts, the Court of
Claims, and the Tax Court. The Court of Tax Appeals, in replacing the
courts of appeals as courts of review of federal tax issues, would, by its
uniform treatment of tax problems, eliminate the present uncertainty
which has been produced by the Commissioner's refusal to follow cer-
tain courts of appeals decisions.5" In co-ordination with the new court,
legislation would have to be adopted requiring the Commissioner to fol-
low those decisions of the lower courts which he did not appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeals. Thus non-acquiescence by the Commissioner
would be limited to those cases pending appellate review. Appeals from
the Court of Tax Appeals would be handled by the Supreme Court, and
it is probable that the Supreme Court would continue its policy of limit-
ing itself to "substantial" constitutional questions." Review by the Su-
preme Court on certiorari would still exist; however, this would not af-
fect the finality of the decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals to any great
extent."0 A denial of certiorari would conclusively settle the point in
question and the Commissioner would be bound to follow. the Tax Court
of Appeals' decision. Although this solution would vest a great deal of
finality in decisions of the proposed court, any decision would still be
subject to legislative correction.6' Under the present system Congress
usually does not enact legislation until the Supreme Court has rendered
a decision on the issue.65 Before an issue is settled by the Supreme
Court, the Commissioner is free to battle out his interpretation in the
courts of appeals and Congress is generally content to await the result.
57. ANN. REP. OF THE Div. OF THE ADr. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs. 149-151 (1955).
58. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
59. See Rule 15(f) of the RULES OF THE Sup. CT., as revised 1954, 74 Sup. Ct. 942
(1954).
60. The Commissioner would not be bound immediately to implement a decision
if he had applied for certiorari, or if it had been granted. See Griswold, The Need for
a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166-69 (1944).
61. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1951, § 117(j), 65 STAT. 500, (result of Watson v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 345 U.S. 544 (1953)) ; Revenue Act
of 1951, § 117(j) (1), 65 STAT. 501, (derived from Albright v. United States, 173 F.2d
339 (8th Cir. 1949)). See Paul, Dobson v. Commi.ssioner: The Strange Ways of Law
and Fact, 57 HARV. L. REv. 753, 760, n. 29 (1944). Little time need be lost in legislative
correction. In Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931), a decision was
delivered by the Supreme Court and the next day Congress overruled the holding.
46 STAT. 1516.
62. See, e.g., Technical Changes Act of 1949, § 811(c), 63 STAT. 894 (result of
Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949)) ; Technical Changes Act of 1949, §
811(c), 63 STAT. 894, (result of Commissioner v. Church, 335 U. S. 632 (1949)). See
Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. REV.
753, 760, n. 29 (1944).
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However, if the Commissioner were bound by a decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals, Congress would be more prone to act at this stage. Con-
gress, through the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, whose
task is "to investigate the operation and effects of the Federal system of
internal revenue taxes,""3 should find it relatively easy to watch one
court on tax matters rather than the eleven courts of appeals and the
Court of Claims.
The argument which is consistently voiced against such a court is
that it would be too specialized."4 First of all, it would be a congres-
sionally created court with the same stature as the present courts of ap-
peals, its judges having the full privileges of federal judges ;" therefore,
a judgeship would be a position demanding the appointment of the most
capable men. These judges would hardly lose all contact with other
fields of law and social order. Tax cases embrace many phases of law,
and therefore demand and foster judicial intimacy with the entire spec-
trum of legal scholarship. Moreover, the court would be in a better posi-
tion to determine how various issues relate to the interests of the entire
country than would a single court of appeals. 6 The general acceptance
of the present Tax Court demonstrates that little public animosity exists
toward an expert tribunal in the federal tax area.
A problem inherent in any centralized court, is the inconvenience
and expense of travel to Washington, D. C., for an appeal. This could
be overcome by requiring the proposed court, en banc, to hold regular
sessions at several convenient, geographic locations in the country. An-
other problem is whether one court could handle the amount of litigation
which would be thrust upon it. In the last few years the annual number
of tax cases handled by all the courts of appeals has averaged 325.67 On
the average a court of appeals annually disposes of a total of about 300
cases in all fields of law after hearing or submission. Therefore, the
volume of litigation before a Court of Tax Appeals would not be sig-
nificantly greater than the litigation handled yearly by an average court
of appeals. Furthermore, there is likelihood that the volume of tax liti-
gation at the appellate level would decline once an appellate decision is
63. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 5001, 53 STAT. 503 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
8002).
64. See Angell, Procedural Reform in the Judicial Review of Controversies under
the Internal Revenue Statutes: An Answer to a Proposal, 34 ILL. L. Rv. 151 (1939);
Prettyman, A Comment on the Traynor Plan for Revision of Federal Tax Procedure,
27 GEO. L. J. 1038 (1939).
65. This would include freedom from diminution of compensation, pensions on
retirement and appointments terminable only for cause.
66. See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
67. Survey of ANN. REP. OF COanI'R OF INT. REV., vols. 1951-1955.
68. See ANN. REP. OF THE DIR. OF THE ADM. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 152-154 (1955).
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given the effect of stire decisis. No reason would exist for litigation of
identical issues in several appellate circuits.89
A more theoretical criticism which might be offered against the
adoption of the court is the sacrifice of appellate review of a regional,
geographic nature. The argument would point out that federal taxes
touch all the people and their everyday living; therefore, appeal should
lie with judges of their own circuit."0 Judges who reside in a region are
assumed to be aware of its needs. There are two counter arguments.
First, if a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals had an adverse effect
on a geographic region, the congressmen from those districts would be
in a position to start legislative action to correct the evil. 7' The issue
would thus be resolved in terms of what is best for the whole country,
and there would be uniformity of its application. Secondly, a comparable
court, the Tax Court, has been effective and has met with little public
animosity. The Tax Court hands down approximately 1100 decisions
a year.72 During the last four years approximately 530 cases have been
appealed by the taxpayer from the some 4500 decisions made by the Tax
Court.' Furthermore, some of these cases were appealed because con-
trary court of appeals decisions made appeal appear profitable. During
the past four years there have been approximately 1350 decisions in dis-
trict courts concerning tax issues and of these approximately 400 have
been appealed."' These facts indicate that there has been no great public
dissatisfaction with a court which is not regional in nature." And
finally, the federal tax laws should not, in theory, reflect geographic dis-
crimination; they are designed for nation wide uniformity in application.
In conclusion it appears that the Court of Tax Appeals ultimately is
the only solution which lends itself to three essentials of federal tax
law-uniformity, stability, and publicity. This court could provide a
69. Under our present system there is litigation by the taxpayer when the Com-
missioner will not follow a court of appeals decision. Also some cases naturally arise
at the same time in different circuits, and these could be consolidated for appeal before
the new court.
70. Query whether a decision local in flavor is good for a whole country. See,
e.g., Watson v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U.S. 544 (1953).
71. See note 61 supra.
72. Survey of ANN. REP. OF COMM'R OF INT. IEv., vols. 1951-1955.
73. Nevitt, Achie'ving Uniformity Aniong the ii Courts of Last Resort, 34 TAXES
311 (1956).
74. These figures exclude bankruptcy, receivership, insolvency, compromise and
liquor cases. Survey of ANN. REP. OF CoMM'R OF INT. REv., vols. 1951-1955.
75. Air. Griswold draws the analogy of the Court of Customs Appeals to the
Court of Tax Appeals. The former has been successful since its establishment in 1909,
but prior to that date the customs field had many problems similar to the present field
of tax law. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1153,
1174-76 (1944).
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basis for equal treatment to small and large taxpayers.76 On the other
hand, solutions to administrative and revenue issues, vital to the Internal
Revenue Service in carrying out its functions, would be more quickly
determined. These results are both desirable and practical.
76. Initially some taxpayer would be forced to bear the costs of litigation in going
before the Court of Tax Appeals; however, after the ruling of the Court, all taxpayers
would be treated alike on the point decided. Subsequent litigation of the point would
seldom arise since it would be unprofitable for taxpayers to re-litigate a settled question.
